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Private Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Los Angeles
Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller, and Laura Petersen*

I. INTRODUCTION
Formal dispute resolution, long thought to be the province of the state, seems
to have piqued the interest of the private sector in recent years as a possible sphere
of activity. In settings where courts are clogged and criminal cases are forcing
civil cases off the calendar, where public juries are perceived as "out of control,"
and where many individuals are disillusioned with incremental tort reform; a
growing number of private individuals are selling their services as neutrals to
facilitate dispute resolution. For-profit firms, both independent and national
networks, are springing up and positioning themselves in major metropolitan areas.
Nonprofit organizations, both new and well-established, are actively marketing an
expanding array of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services to an increasingly
diverse audience of potential consumers.
This flurry of activity does not spring from a conscious public decision to
privatize the provision of judicial services. Instead, it stems from an
entrepreneurial intuition that privately developed portfolios of dispute resolution
services can be competitive despite subsidies to the public sector. Since formal
provision of dispute resolution has traditionally been an exclusively public
function, the following questions arise: Is there a public interest that should
govern in the evolution of this private dispute resolution market? Should this
market be encouraged? Should it be regulated? Should it simply be left alone?
Shaping sound answers to these difficult questions must reasonably depend first
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upon developing a clear understanding of the nature of the newly emerging private
marketplace.

A. What Is Private Alternative Dispute Resolution?
Terminology in this field is new and often inconsistently applied because
there has been both a growing awareness of the private dispute marketplace and
a recent proliferation of services. For example, "private judging" is used by some
to refer to all disputes taken to third-party neutrals for some form of counsel or
disposition. To others, however, "private judging" refers only to that very small
subset of cases referred through the courts to a third-party neutral.
For the purposes of this inquiry, we define private ADR as any dispute
resolution service provided for a fee by a third-party neutral outside the court
system.
Any party that might normally be a party to a dispute may be a disputant in
private ADR. Such parties may be businesses, individuals, government entities or
insurance companies representing principals.
Disputants can come to a private setting by any one of several roads. The
dispute can arise in the course of a contractual relationship in which the parties
have agreed before the dispute arose to settle any differences through private
ADR. Such predispute agreements are increasingly a condition of receiving
service in the banking industry and the health care industry.' Such agreements
are also commonly found in employment contracts, construction contracts, and
uninsured motorist coverage insurance contracts. Disputants may also agree to
take disputes to private ADR after the disputes have arisen, believing that they will
get a speedier, less-expensive process and a better-reasoned decision. In some
states, disputants may move into private ADR while remaining under the court's
jurisdiction. That is, with their case still active in the court, they may choose or
the judge may direct them to take the dispute or some phase of its processing,
such as discovery, to a private neutral for resolution. Disputants in these "court
referenced" cases must pay private fees, but usually retain their right to appeal.
When disputants take their dispute to a third-party neutral, either in
accordance with the terms of the predispute agreement or by mutual agreement it
may mean that they take their dispute to a firm that provides private ADR
services. These ADR services usually include both administering the disputing
process and providing a select panel of neutrals from which the disputants can
choose. Such firms include the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). It may also mean that the
disputants take their dispute to an independent neutral with no firm affiliation.

1. See DIsPuTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A GUIDE FOR DRAFTERS OF BUSINESS AGREEMENTS
(1994), and Erik Moiler and Elizabeth Rolph, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE BANKING
INDUSTRY (1993).
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Because private ADR is usually a matter of choice or private contract, no
restrictions or requirements apply to the neutrals. In all instances, fees are
privately agreed upon by the parties.
Because private ADR is typically the product of a contract or an agreement,
no rules other than the terms of the agreement govern the nature of the dispute
resolution procedure or whether it is binding. As a result, firms and providers are
free to offer a full menu of conventional procedures such as arbitration, mediation,
summary jury trials, or fact-finding. They may also create new options that better
meet the demands of their clients.

B. The Policy Issues
Whether or not private ADR should even enter the realm of public scrutiny
is the subject of considerable controversy. On the one hand, private ADR is based
on a private contractual agreement between parties which normally does not
command public interest. On the other hand, the provision of dispute resolution
through our public system of justice is a central function of the state and is closely
linked with such important public responsibilities as maintaining order and
establishing norms of behavior. Thus, good arguments can be made to support
and to oppose investigation and perhaps ultimate regulation of this new market.
This debate over the private provision of a public service is a recurring theme
in public policy.' Those in favor of privatization argue that government is too
big and that the private market is more efficient than government for allocating
resources. Those disfavoring privatization counter with the argument that equity
and distributional concerns require some services to be provided by a public entity.
The privatization of judicial services has been a part of this discussion and the
subject of numerous papers.'
Setting these arguments aside, private ADR has already divided its ranks of
observers. Supporters claim that growth in the private ADR marketplace will
benefit both the public and the user communities. These supporters argue that
diverting cases to the private sector will reduce the growing burdens on the public
courts, which, in turn, will reduce public costs and allow the courts to offer better
and faster service to the remaining disputants. At the same time, the supporters
assert that private ADR can provide disputants with faster, less expensive
processes that can be tailored to their particular needs and are managed by

2. See, e.g., CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT
ALTERNA'nVES (1993); E.S. SAVAS, PRiVATIZiNG THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1982); and RANDY Ross,
GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: WHO SHOULD DO WHAT (1988).
3. See, e.g., W. Landes & R. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES, 235 -384 (1979); S. Shavell, The Social versus Private Incentives to Bring Suit in a Costly
Legal System, 11 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 333-40 (1982); L. Kaplow, Private versus Social
Costs of Bringing Suit, 15 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 371-86 (1986); and R. Cooter & D.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolutions, 27 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1067-97 (1989).
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experienced neutrals. In addition, private ADR offers a private setting for dispute
resolution which, supporters allege, is less stressful and more likely to facilitate
resolution.4
Opponents of private ADR, on the other hand, argue that private ADR serves
neither public nor private interests well. These opponents prophesy that movement
of business and insurance disputes from the public into a private setting will lead
to the further erosion of financial support for public judicial services and will
create a system that offers two-tiered justice to the privileged few. Opponents also
believe that private ADR will strip the bench of its best and most experienced
judicial talent as good judges leave for the higher wages and better working
conditions of the private sector. Moreover, because private ADR proceedings and
decisions are not public, society will be deprived of cases that may be valuable
vehicles for establishing precedent and articulating behavioral norms. Disputants
in the private sector will be deprived of many of the procedural safeguards, such
as the right to appeal, offered in the public sector. Opponents also argue that
neutrals will have strong incentives to rule in favor of disputants who offer the
best prospect of repeat business as the neutral may be anxious to please customers
and "build a practice."5
At the moment, however, arguments on both sides of the question are
speculative. The private ADR market is new, and we have very little empirical
information to provide a sound basis for exploring the very complex questions
raised in the arguments. The purpose of this study is to begin to bridge that gap.

C. Study Focus and Research Questions
As a first step in laying the groundwork for further explorations, we must
equip ourselves with a basic descriptive understanding of the nature of the private
ADR marketplace. The nature of the private ADR marketplace breaks into three
important components:
"
"
"

Consumers: disputants and their disputes;
The Product: ADR services and price; and,
Producers: neutrals supplying ADR services.

In this report, after summarizing the broad outlines of the market, we will
examine the characteristics of consumers of private ADR. This examination will
especially focus on caseload characteristics including volume, seriousness, and
types of disputes. We will also examine the availability of ADR procedures, the

4. See M. Galanter & J. Lande, Private Courts and Public Authority, 14 STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 393-415 (1992).
5. See, e.g., R. Reuben, The Dark Side ofADR, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, February 1994, at 5358; Galanter & Lande, supra note 4.
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frequency with which they may be used, and the market's fee structure. Finally,
we will look more closely at the provider community and explore the relevant
characteristics of third-party neutrals, including independent neutrals and neutrals
serving on firm panels.

D. Methods and Data Sources
To allow us to explore these questions in some depth, we narrowed our focus
of attention to a well-defined population of cases and to a single geographical area.
We have chosen Los Angeles as the study site for many reasons. Los
6
Angeles is a major metropolitan area with a large and diverse court caseload.
The Los Angeles Superior Court is also a court which the Institute for Civil
Justice has studied extensively, thus giving us valuable data for comparing public
and private caseloads. 7 At the same time, the anecdotal evidence suggests that
Los Angeles has an active and rapidly growing private ADR marketplace.
Because Los Angeles is on the "cutting edge," what we learn from this study could
be predictive of what other regions will experience in the future.
We also limited our population of cases by type and time. Our analysis
captures all civil money disputes but specifically excludes family law, probate, and
other types of disputes falling outside of the definition of civil money disputes.
The analysis is also cross-sectional, including only cases and service providers
that were active in 1992 and 1993. Although a longitudinal study would have
permitted us to identify direction and degree of change in the volatile marketplace,
the data from both the providing firms and the independent neutrals unfortunately
would not support this more ambitious format.
Our analysis is based primarily on data from four sources: open-ended
interviews with firms providing private ADR services, case records from a subset
of those firms, a survey of all third-party neutrals offering services in the Los
Angeles area, and Los Angeles County Superior Court case records
1. Firm Interviews
In an initial screening survey, we contacted 22 firms offering private ADR
services in the Los Angeles area.9 Using information regarding size, caseload,
and type of cases gathered; we selected the six most active firms, which between

6. See J.S. Kakalik, M. Selvin, & N.M. Pace, Averting Gridlock: Strategiesfor Reducing Civil
Delay in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3762-ICJ (1990).

7. Id
8. This information was supplemented by information provided in the Annual Data Reference
publications of the Judicial Council of California.
9. The ADR firms offering services in the Los Angeles area were originally identified and
contacted in 1992. We updated the 1992 list and contacted the firms again in 1993, eliminating those
that did not provide services that conform with our definition of private ADR and adding new firms
that had entered the market during the intervening year.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1996, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
(Vol. 1996, No. 2
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
them handle approximately 60 percent of the private civil caseload, and returned
to them for complete interviews. These six firms supplied both descriptive
interview information and marketing materials on their histories, services, and
practices.
2. Firm Case Records
Of these six firms, three agreed to provide access to case-level data files for
the year 1992, and a fourth agreed to provide aggregate caseload information
which we specified.1
3. Survey of Neutrals
In addition to collecting information from firms providing private ADR, we
conducted a mail and telephone survey of the neutrals who provide services in the
Los Angeles area. In these mail and telephone surveys, we gathered information
regarding the neutrals' patterns of practice and the characteristics of disputes that
came directly to them. The timing of the mail survey was such that we asked for
information about each of the disputes that came to them during the first seven
months of 1993, assuming that this information would be comparable to firm caselevel data collected in 1992.1 We mailed questionnaires to all those persons who
were identified by the firms we contacted as members of their provider panels.
In one case, the firm's panel list included almost 1,200 names, so we randomly
sampled from this list. 2 Otherwise, all panel members were surveyed. In
addition, we sent questionnaires to all individuals not already identified as panel
members and who were listed in the 1992 Directory of California Lawyers as
"Private Judges" and "Arbitrators and Mediators" serving the Los Angeles area,
and in the local telephone directory or in advertisements providing ADR services
for civil cases. There was substantial overlap among the various lists; ultimately,
we sent questionnaires to 715 potential respondents. One hundred and seventyfour were categorized as "ineligible"; that is, they either had not served as a
neutral sometime during the previous five years or were deceased. Of the
remaining 541 individuals, 48 percent of the eligible population responded through
the mail questionnaire.. That response rate was increased to 76 percent through

10. One of the largest companies supplied us with five years of data, hoping that we could
ultimately conduct a longitudinal analysis. The others either were newly launched or did not have
computerized records predating 1991.
11. Respondents were likely to be referring to their daily calendars for information on cases. To
ensure high-quality data and a good response rate, we asked only about disputes respondents heard in
1993- the year they received the questionnaire.
12. In this case, the firm lists its entire membership as potential neutrals, despite the fact that
many do not provide neutral services.
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follow-up telephone interviews. 3 All completed surveys were weighted for the
analysis. Our results indicate that there are approximately 1,200 neutrals serving
the Los Angeles area.
To determine whether or not the respondent populations for the mail and
telephone surveys were different, we compared respondent characteristics and
found no systematic bias. We also checked responses to selected questions for
internal consistency, which we found to be high.
4. Superior Court Case Records
Finally, to compare characteristics of the public and private case-loads, we
obtained Los Angeles Superior Court case records for all civil matters opened
between 1988 and 1992. This data set includes information on the parties, the
type of action, the filing and disposition dates, and the type of disposition.

E. Organization
We organized this report according to the research areas listed above. In
Section II, we present information on the characteristics of the ADR caseload and
the disputants. In Section III, we describe both the ADR services offered and used
by disputants and examine the pricing structures of the firms and independent
neutrals. In Section IV, we develop a profile of the third-party neutral population,
and, in the final section, we review our findings and conclusions based on some
of the policy issues raised previously.

II. THE DEMAND SIDE: DISPUTES AND DISPUTANTS
Renewed interest in private ADR has been the direct result of perceptions that
it is a growing phenomenon and that, in some reasonable period of time, it will
account for a significant share of the dispute resolution delivered. Only as it
achieves some presence in the market can private ADR have any meaningful
effect, for better or worse, on the public judicial system or on disputants
collectively. It must be stressed, however, that the growing interest is based on
"perceptions." Because this is a private market, there are no public records to
document changes in use. The decentralized and often sketchy information that
does exists in the private sector is generally very tightly controlled.
In this chapter, we draw on information collected from private ADR service
firms, neutrals, and the Los Angeles courts to profile the caseload and disputants
using private ADR services and to compare private-sector with public-sector use.

13. A few questions were omitted from the telephone survey to shorten the response time required.
Otherwise, the questions were the same.
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A number of characteristics are of particular interest since they bear most directly
on current policy debates. They include the following:
Volume-The size of the private caseload is important because it suggests
the limits of costs and/or benefits that currently result from private ADR. If,
contrary to popular belief, very few cases are going to private resolution, then
there may be less likelihood that private activity is affecting the public sector.
There would also be less concern with the costs and benefits it may bestow on
users.
o

Growth rate-Like volume, growth rate is an important measure of the
likelihood that the private sector is or will be a significant component of the
dispute resolution marketplace. It is particularly important as a window of the
future role of the private sector.
o

*
Value of disputes-Case value is one measure of the importance of a case
and of the likelihood that the case will occupy some court time. ADR is
sometimes associated with "little cases"-casesthat would not be pursued without
the simpler, less expensive ADR option. If private ADR is composed principally
of these "little cases," it may not be absorbing the cases that actually consume
public court time and resources.
0
Durability of disputes-Durability of disputes refers to the likelihood that
a case will proceed to some kind of third-party intervention. It is used as a second
indicator of the seriousness of a dispute and the likelihood that it will consume
court time.
0
Types of cases-Case type refers to the class of civil dispute being pursued,
e.g., personal injury, employment, or medical malpractice. Knowing the
proportions of different types of cases that go to private ADR not only gives us
further insight into the importance of various classes of disputes to the overall
caseload, it also may help identify ADR's particular appeal and bound our
projections of future growth.
Types of disputants---For this analysis, we classify disputants as individuals
or businesses based on their listed names in the case record. A corollary of the
argument that ADR attracts small cases is that it attracts novice disputants, those
who would not be pursuing their disputes but for the availability of a less
expensive, and less imposing process. If this is true, then a disproportionate
number of disputants are likely to be individuals. On the other hand, some argue
that private ADR offers experienced disputants an efficient, friendly environment
in which to pursue their disputes and, perhaps, even an environment so eager to
see their return that heavy users receive favored treatment. If the latter scenario
o
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is more the measure of reality, we might expect to see disproportionate numbers
of businesses, especially larger businesses.
We characterizethe private ADR disputes and disputants on these dimensions
and conclude with a brief discussion of the various routes available to private
ADR.

A.

Volume

Volume is, perhaps, the most obvious measure of the importance of the
private ADR caseload. Speculation and anecdotes aside, how many disputes is this
alternative system ofjustice actually handling, and what fraction of Los Angeles'
total dispute caseload does that encompass?
To address these questions, we constructed a measure of the total ADR
caseload by adding all disputes that neutrals reported handling both through firms
and independent of firms 4 and compared that number with caseload reports for
Los Angeles Superior, Municipal, and Small Claims Courts published by the
California Judicial Council. Table 1 shows that of the total 465,578 disputes filed
in Los Angeles during 1993, an overwhelming 95 percent were resolved in the
public sector (small claims, municipal, and superior courts). The remainder were
split between firms and independent neutrals handling cases that come directly to
them. In reality, our analysis slightly underestimates the proportion of disputes
that are being disposed of by the private sector because a substantial number of
those disputes were previously filed in the public sector. Because firms and
independent neutrals often do not know the status of disputes that they handle, our
respondents were only able to identify the status of 71 percent of their caseload.
Of these disputes, respondents report that 72 percent had been filed previously in
the public courts. If we apply this same percentage to the total private caseload,
it suggests that the private sector may account for 5.3 percent of the total dispute
caseload which is not a meaningful difference.

14. To confirm the accuracy of this reported data, we compared the neutrals' estimates with data
from cooperating firms and found that the two were consistent.
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Table 1
Distribution of Disputes Between the Public
and Private Sectors in 1993
Percentage
Number of
of Total
Claims Filed
Courts (superior, municipal,
94.9
441,906
and small claims)a
Private ADR
2.8
12,941
Firms
2.3
10,731
Independent neutrals
5.1
23,672
Total
100.0
465,578
Total disputes
'Data from Judicial Council of California (1994).
If one looks only at volume, it is hard to describe private ADR as a major
player in dispute resolution. Volume, however, is not determinative and should
not be the only measure of importance.

B. Growth in the Private Sector
A second measure of the role private ADR can be expected to play in
delivering justice is its growth rate. To determine the growth rate, we asked
neutrals in our survey how many private civil disputes they had handled in each
of the years from 1988 to 1993. Simply determining the rate of growth in the
private sector, however, does not tell us whether private ADR is increasing its
share of the total caseload, maintaining a stable share or, perhaps, receiving a
declining market share in the context of a very rapid general increase in disputing.
To provide a baseline against which to measure changes in reported private ADR
activity," we also compared the experience in the private sector with changes in
the number of cases filed in the Los Angeles courts over that same period.
Figure 1 shows that the private ADR caseload in Los Angeles grew steadily
at an average rate of about 15 percent per year between 1988 and 1993.6 This
is in sharp contrast to the public caseload, which actually decreased an average of
about 0.5 percent between 1988 and 1993. Even in 1993, when the public

15. We specifically asked respondents to report only private disputes and exclude any courtannexed cases that they might have handled.
16. We recognize that our numbers probably overestimate the growth somewhat, but not a great
deal. Some who provided services in earlier years are no longer available to answer our survey. Our
estimate for the private caseload in 1988, for example, is, in all likelihood, lower than the actual
private caseload. Also, because we asked respondents about cases that they had "handled" in a given
year, there is some small possibility that a few disputes straddled two years and were counted twice.
We do not think this very likely, both because disputes that go to the private sector do not remain
active for long periods and because respondents understood that we were interested in numbers of
cases.
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caseload shrank by over 50,000 cases, private ADR continued to account for a
growing number of disputes resolved. These results attest to the fact that the Los
Angeles market for private ADR, although certainly small, young, and vulnerable,
has experienced strong and steady growth over the last several years. Since no
current evidence suggests a substantial qhange in relative growth rates of the courts
and the private sector, private ADR may well become a significant feature in the
judicial landscape. If one extrapolates current ADR growth trends against a stable
population of disputes, private ADR could resolve as many as 13 percent of the
area's disputes by the year 2000.
RANDMR472-3. I

100
80

!
U

PrivateADR
Public courtsb

600

.0

20

1988

1991

1990

1989

1992

1993

Year
bJudicia Council of California (1989-1994).

Figure 1
Percentage of Growth Since 1988

C. Value of Disputes
Alternative dispute resolution is frequently believed to be a good way to
dispose of small cases-cases that deserve a hearing but do not warrant the court's
time. 7 Consistent with that view, research into the effects of judicial arbitration
suggests that the availability of court programs may increase the number of small
cases filed because litigants see the opportunity for a less formal and less
expensive hearing.'"
We might expect that private ADR provides a similar opportunity in the private
sector. Rather than resolving more substantial cases that would otherwise be
consuming court time and resources, private ADR would generate its own demand

17. See NATIONAL CENTER
18. Id.

FOr

STATE COURTS/STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE (1994).
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in the community of small-stakes claimants who would not have pursued their
claims in the courts. Surprisingly, both our claim and award data provide
evidence to the contrary.
We combined individual claims data from one large firm with similar data
from our survey of neutrals.' 9 As Table 2 shows, the amount in question was
greater than $25,000 in 60 percent of these disputes as compared with 14 percent
in the public court caseload (p < 0.01).'0 Although our estimate may be
somewhat high because the firm that supplied claims data handled a higher-stakes
caseload than most other firms. Any reasonable adjustment, however, would still
show a substantial difference between public and private claim amounts.
Furthermore, of the private caseload, the cases that do not go to firms but,
rather, go directly to neutrals are by far the highest-stakes group of all, with claim
amounts of $25,000 or more reported for 69 percent of the cases. Figure 2 shows
how disputes going directly to independent neutrals are distributed across the range
of values.
Table 2
Distribution of Disputes > $25,000
Total Number Number of Cases Percentage
of Cases
of Cases
> $25,000
11,340
6,783
60
Private caseload
Firm a
31
69
Independent neutrals
All Los Angeles courtsb
441,906
61,438
14
'Case-level data from one firm for 1992. Numbers of cases not presented to
protect identity of firm.
bSuperior Court caseload (1993); Judicial Council (1993).
The conclusion that serious disputes account for a substantial share of the
private caseload was generally affirmed by our examination of awards. We did,
however, find marked differences in the award distribution both among the firms
and between the firms and the independent neutrals. Figure 3 shows that cases
resolved through firms have substantially lower award amounts than cases that go
directly to neutrals. The fact that 66 percent of the cases handled through firms
receive a defense verdict, in contrast to only 16 percent of those handled directly
by neutrals (p < 0.01), suggests that liability is generally less clear in disputes

19. Firms often do not keep claim information, and only one firm in our group could supply it.

20. This percentage constitutes the proportion of the total Los Angeles caseload that is filed in
Superior Court. The Superior Court requires as one of its sources ofjurisdiction that the amount in
contest be $25,000 or more.
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Figure 2
Claim Amounts for Non-Firm Disputes

RANDMR472.3.3

Defense
verdict
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$25-50 $51-100 $101-500
Award amount (thousands)
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Figure 3
Size of Awards for Firms and Independent Neutrals
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resolved through frms. '

Survey results suggest that the value of private ADR disputes is increasing.
Slightly less than half of the neutrals who responded to our survey thought the
values of their caseloads had increased over the last five years, while a similar
number thought
it had remained the same, and only 9 percent thought it had
22
declined.

D. Durability of Disputes
Disputes going to private ADR are not only comparatively high-value
disputes, they also appear to be durable disputes. This means that they are
disputes that ultimately require third-party intervention. Table 3 shows that 73
percent of all private ADR disputes continue to some form of third-party
intervention (an arbitration hearing, a mediation, a mini-trial, etc.). This is in
sharp contrast to the 14 percent of all Superior Court filings that ever reach a
settlement conference. Perhaps many disputants only seek private ADR when they
conclude that they cannot reach a bilateral settlement. Table 3 also shows the
This
substantial variation among firms of cases with third party intervention.
Table 3
Percentage of Cases That Go to
Third-Party Intervention
Private ADR
Firms
68
Firm 1
90
Firm 2
46
Firm 3
78
Totala
70
Independent neutrals
73
Total private ADR
14
Superior Courtb
aFirm case-level data.
bKakalik (1990). This is the percentage of Superior
Court cases that remained in the system long enough to
reach the mandatory settlement conference procedure,
which involves considerable judicial intervention with
the parties.

21. In addition to variation between cases that go to firms and those that go directly to neutrals,
there is also substantial variation across firms in the percentage of disputes that receive a defense
verdict.
22. This question was on the mailed questionnaire, but it was not part of the telephone interview.
Therefore, respondents who answered questions in the phone interview are not part of this summary.
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substantial variation may be, at least in part, attributable to differences in firm
filing or administrative fees which are levied when a dispute is brought to a firm
and can be quite substantial (See Section Three).

E. Types of Disputes
Although we are unable to make exact comparisons of the mix of public and
private sector disputes because we do not have precisely comparable data, our data
suggest that their respective caseloads differ significantly.23 Using the Judicial
Council case type categories, Table 4 shows that the private sector has a
substantially higher proportion of auto personal injury cases than the Superior
Court (43 percent versus 29 percent) but has a somewhat lower proportion of other
personal injury and civil complaints (p < 0.01). It seems unlikely, although
possible, that these differences would disappear if we were to incorporate the
Municipal and Small Claims cases.
The difference in caseload composition can, at least in part, be explained by
the private ADR firms' aggressive targeting of auto insurance companies in their
marketing. Our interviews of private ADR firms suggest that these companies
seek the opportunity to develop relationships with identified sources for
continuing streams of future cases. Persuading corporate disputants to name a
particular firm or a firm's procedural rules in the disputants' predispute contracts
can accomplish similar results. AAA and JAMS, for example, use this tool
aggressively in their marketing.
Table 4
Case Type by Sector (percent)
Private'
Courts'
Civil complaints
41
46
43
29
Auto personal injury
26
Other personal injury
16
'Firm case-level data.
bSuperior Court Caseload (1993); Judicial
Council (1994).
The private ADR caseload has several interesting characteristics that suggest
that private ADR attracts particular types of disputes and that fins and
independent providers play somewhat different roles in the marketplace.
Table 5, column 3, shows that the rates for the types of disputes which are
brought into the private sector vary. It also confirms the predominance of auto
personal injury, which accounts for 42 percent of all cases brought to private

23. There is no publicly available information on the types of disputes that make up the total
caseload of the Los Angeles courts. The California Judicial Council, however, does report the Los
Angeles County Superior Court's caseload broken into three major types of disputes.
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ADR. There are several explanations for this distribution. While it may simply
reflect the underlying case-type population, ADR may be considered more
appropriate for some types of cases than for others. Variations may also be
explained by the preferences of attorneys or insurers who, acting as procedural
gatekeepers, are likely to play a major role in directing disputes to ADR. For
example, those persons handling auto personal injury might take their cases to
ADR more frequently because they may be more familiar and more comfortable
with ADR procedures than those who handle other types of cases.
Case mixes vary not only between firms and independents (p < 0.01) but also
among firms. For example, Table 5, columns I and 2 show that auto personal
injury, malpractice, and employment disputes play a more prominent role in the
caseload of independent neutrals than in the caseload of firms. Independent
neutrals also seem more likely to attract the types of disputes that are typically
of higher value (see Table 3). Variations among firms can also be substantial.
For example, construction cases make up 23 percent of one large firm's caseload,
while only one other firm handles any (1 percent of its caseload) construction
cases.24 These differences probably reflect the targeted marketing strategies of
firms which are each seeking a profitable market niche. Independent neutrals as
a group, on the other hand, handle a broader caseload.
Table 5
and
Independent Case Mixa (percent)
of
Firm
Comparison
Total Private
Independent
Firm'
42
46
36
Auto personal injury
12
16
8
Employment
13
9
20
Other contract
9
6
Non-auto personal injury 13
7
4
10
Construction
6
5
7
Real property
4
5
2
Malpractice
'Case categories with fewer than 3 percent of the caseload omitted.
bFirm case-level data.
'Private auto personal injury differs between Table 4 and Table 5 because of
rounding.
To determine whether or not the case mix is changing, we asked the
providers, both firms and independent neutrals, if they have observed any changes
in the mix over the past few years. Respondents generally agree that little change
has occurred. Firms report no changes, and only a few neutrals observed change
and noted a relatively greater number of auto personal injury and employment
cases in the mix than any other type of case.

24. To preserve confidentiality, we cannot report the breakdown of case types by individual firms.
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Only three of the cooperating firms provided us with data on the awards for
all cases within each category of disputes. Not surprisingly, we found that the
amount of the case award varied with the type of dispute. Table 6a shows that a
defense verdict is rendered in 95 percent of the employment disputes, while a
defense verdict is rendered in only 23 percent of the consumer disputes. At the
Table 6a
Distribution of Award Amounts
Within Case-Type Categories for Three Firms (percent)
Award Amounts
$50Defense
0100K
$25K
Verdict
Case Types
3
35
51
Construction
1
43
Auto personal injury
53
0
4
95
Employment
3
37
55
Real property
5
22
62
Other contract
2
23
71
Other personal injury
2
22
66
Unknown
8
88
1
Other
77
23
0
Consumer
50
50
0
Product liability
0
33
67
Other tort
Total distribution of
2
4
29
award amounts
63
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

$1oo500K >$500K
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
3
1

2
0

5
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

2

1

Table 6b
Distribution of Case Types
Within Award-Amount Categories for Three Firms (percent)
Award Amounts

Total

Distribution
$50- $100of Case
100K 500K >$500K
Case Types
Types
19
35
29
31
23
30
15
Construction
16
0
4
14
4
14
24
Auto personal injury
13
0
6
3
2
2
20
Employment
13
12
9
13
17
11
17
Real property
11
35
20
9
20
26
11
Other contract
11
9
0
9
11
9
13
Other personal injury
8
12
26
8
7
9
9
Unknown
4
0
2
3
1
6
1
Other
3
0
0
0
0
1
8
Consumer
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Product liability
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other tort
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
0Defense
Verdict $25K

$2550K
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same time, Table 6b shows that auto personal injury disputes account for almost
a quarter (24 percent) of disputes in which awards are less than $25,000, and
employment disputes account for the greatest share of defense verdicts (20
percent).
F. Disputant Characteristics
The available measures of disputant characteristics are extremely imperfect
indicators of either the sophistication of the disputant as a consumer of ADR
services or of the compelling factors bringing the disputant to private ADR. The
relative proportions of businesses and individuals in the disputing population,
however, may at least indicate whether private ADR is becoming the exclusive
domain of businesses attempting to cut litigation costs and circumvent juries or,
alternatively, of individual disputants anxious to pursue disputes in what they may
believe is a less expensive, friendlier setting.
To determine how often individuals and businesses dispute in public and
private forums, we identified the principal plaintiffs and defendants as either
individuals or businesses based on a random sample of Superior Court cases25
and a census of private ADR cases. Table 7 shows that both businesses and
individuals are well represented in the private and public forums. The
significantly (p < 0.0 1) larger percentage of business-versus-business disputes in
the private sector suggests that private ADR is particularly attractive to business
disputants.
Businesses may force individuals into private ADR through predispute
contract clauses when the business is either the plaintiff/claimant or the
defendant/respondent in a dispute. For this reason, we aggregated into one
category all disputes in which a disputant on one side of the dispute is an
individual and a disputant on the other side of the dispute is a business entity.
Table 7
Disputant Types: Public and Private Sectors(percent)
Private
Courts8
ADRb
43
38
Individual vs. individual
29
Mixed
45
29
Business vs. business
17
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
aLos Angeles County Superior Court case-level data.
bFirm case-level data.

25. We selected a random sample of 4,335 (from a total of 26,507), 1992 Los Angeles Superior
Court cases from which to identify disputants.
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Obscured by the identification of disputants is the fact that insurance
companies also play a substantial role in disputes that are normally between
individuals. Some portion of the disputes between "individuals" in the private
sector may well reflect business (e.g., insurer) rather than individual preferences.
Our survey respondents report that insurance companies represented one or more
of the parties in 69 percent of the disputes that came to them directly. They also
report, as we noted in Table 5, that almost half of these cases were automobile
personal injury disputes in which it is common practice for the individual
represented by an insurance company to be the named party. Given this practice,
it is likely that Table 7 substantially fails to report business involvement.
In sum, our survey indicates the following attributes of private ADR: The
private market for dispute resolution serves a small but growing percentage of Los
Angeles' formal disputes; formal disputes are reasonably high-value and durable
disputes; auto personal injury cases represent a high proportion of formal disputes;
and businesses and insurers are heavy users of private ADR.

III. THE PRODUCT: PRIVATE ADR PROCEDURES
The second major component of the private ADR marketplace is the product.
In this context, the product consists of the dispute resolution procedures. Private
ADR's proponents argue that private ADR procedures are more flexible, quick,
inexpensive, and private than the public court option. Private ADR's opponents
reply that these benefits are undocumented and are outweighed by the associated
costs of growth in the new system which may have grave public consequences.
In this chapter, we first describe the common types of ADR procedures
available to consumers. Then, drawing on our firm interviews, firm caseload data,
and independent neutral survey responses, we determine the following relative to
the Los Angeles marketplace: The types of procedures actually being offered, the
types of procedures used, and the fee structures applied.2' In this analysis, we
consider the private ADR market as a whole and its components separately. The
measures we use include:
o Procedures offered-The range of procedures offered by the private ADR
providers is an important measure of the variety of private ADR available to meet
the needs of disputants in the marketplace. If the range is broad, it indicates that
variety is available in the market. If the range is narrow, this alleged benefit of
the private marketplace may not exist.
0
Procedures provided-The mix of procedures actually provided by the ADR
providers is a measure of the extent to which the disputants are taking advantage
of the available variety of private ADR. If a wide mix of procedures is actually
being provided, disputants are taking advantage of the available variety. If a

26. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to measure time to disposition.
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narrow mix of procedures is being provided, however, then variety is not an
important benefit of private ADR.
Fees--The fee structure of the industry provides an imperfect proxy of the
0
costs of private ADR procedures. A high fee structure would suggest that the
claim that private ADR is less expensive than litigation in the public courts bears
further examination. This measure, however, is only a partial proxy for the costs
of private ADR procedures. Since attorneys' fees and costs account for most of
the costs of dispute resolution in the public courts, this measure is not conclusive.
Proponents often cite privacy as another benefit of private ADR. We do not
discuss privacy beyond noting that it is fairly clear that private ADR offers more
procedural privacy than dispute resolution in the public sector and leads to more
private outcomes. There is no public exposure of the information that is presented
at the proceedings, and the decision has no precedential value. Of course,
considerable debate exists over whether or not the privacy feature is a cost or
benefit of private ADR.

A. Forms of ADR Procedure
It is helpful to begin with definitions of the various dispute resolution formats
or procedures that might be offered by private providers. The taxonomy in private
ADR is particularly confusing since firms, neutrals, and disputants may use
different terms to refer to the same procedure or concept. To clarify our use of
these terms, we offer the following definitions:
Arbitration-Arbitration is any adjudicatory procedure in which a neutral
third party (or panel) hears arguments and reviews evidence provided by the
disputants regarding the dispute between them. The neutral (or panel) then renders
1
a final, binding decision which is not subject to court approval or appeal."
o

o Mediation-In mediation, disputants engage in discussions with each other
through a third party in an attempt to reach a mutually agreed upon settlement.
This procedure operates under an entirely different paradigm from arbitration.
Arbitration is based on the adjudicatory model of the public courts with passive
fact-finding and binding procedure. Mediation, in contrast, is a nonbinding

27. This study specifically excludes court-annexed arbitration. Court-annexed arbitration is not
a choice for disputants, because in California it is mandatory for all superior court cases in which the
amount at issue is under $50,000. Decisions are also not binding. In addition, court-annexed
procedures have been studied reasonably extensively. For a summary of these studies, see National
Center for State Courts/State Justice Institute (1994).
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procedure in which the third-party neutral plays an active role in reaching a
settlement.
Private Judging-"Private judging" refers to any procedure under Cal. Civ.
0
Proc. Code §§ 638, 639 or Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21 in which the parties
compensate the third-party neutral. Under this definition, a case must first be filed
in court. After it is filed, then the entire action or particular aspect of the action
may proceed to private ADR procedure for resolution, typically by agreement of
the parties and by using arbitration. The decision reached in the private ADR
procedure will be reported to the court and treated as the decision of the court,
with all postjudgment remedies available including appeal.28
o Summary Jury Trial-A summary jury trial is a nonbinding procedure in
which a private jury is empaneled from regular jury lists. The parties present
short summaries of their cases, and the jury provides the parties with a realistic
reaction of"realjurors." This nonbinding process provides parties with important
information regarding the case for use in settlement proceedings.
o Mini-Trial-Themini-trial is anotherhybrid dispute resolution processwhich
promotes negotiation and settlement. The attorneys make short presentations to
a third-party neutral who sits with high-level agents of the parties. After the
presentations, the neutral offers his or her opinion to the parties. In addition, the
parties' agents can ask questions of the neutral. Again, the purpose of this
exercise is to provide the parties with information and an independent, nonbinding
opinion of the dispute in order to promote settlement.
o Voluntary Settlement Conference-A voluntary settlement conference is
very similar to a mediation or a court-mandated judicial settlement conference.
The neutrals in mediation, however, are expected to be much more assertive than
neutrals in a voluntary settlement conference. In mediation, neutrals may offer
opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of the various disputants' arguments
and propose creative solutions. In voluntary settlement conferences, neutrals allow
the disputants to direct the negotiation.29
o Neutral Expert Fact-Finding-Neutral expert fact-finding is a procedure in
which certain substantively difficult or technical issues within a dispute are
referred to an expert for a determination. This procedure can be used by voluntary
agreement of the parties or at the direction of a court. The determination made
by the expert may be adopted by the court hearing the dispute.

28. For a detailed study of this form of private ADR, see J. Roehl, R.E. Huitt, & H. Wong,
PrivateJudging: A Study of Its Volume, Nature, and Impact on State Courts, Pacific Grove, Calif.:
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1993).
29. See R. MacCoun, E. Lind, & T. Tyler, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial andAppellate
Courts, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, RP-117, (1992).
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B. ProceduresOffered
Variety in ADR procedures offered by providers is an important measure of
the flexibility available to consumers. Variety comes in three forms. First,
providers may offer a number of different ADR procedures. Second, for each
procedure, considerable variation exists between the firms. Finally, the firms may
also offer customers the opportunity to vary the rules applied within each
procedure. This variation and the opportunity to tailor procedures are important
measures of flexibility.
1. Procedural Options Among Firms
All the firms in our group advertise themselves as offering virtually all of the
services described above.3" Table 8 shows the availability of the various
procedures offered by each ADR firm. Within each type of procedure, variation
is typical. For example, firms report offering several varieties of arbitration, such
as high-low arbitration and mediation-arbitration."'
Procedural rules can also vary. The arbitration rules of some firms make
only rare reference to the Rules of Evidence, while others claim to apply the rules
to their full extent. Similarly, the amount of pre-arbitration procedure varies
considerably. Some rules allow parties the opportunity to obtain discovery and to
have pre-arbitration procedures and motions heard. Under other rules, the parties
cannot do either. The rules of mediation are as varied as the individuals who
provide the service. Each has his or her own style and procedures. Some
mediators only meet with disputants separately. Others also meet with the
disputants together as they try to reach settlement. Some mediators want to know
the substance of the dispute prior to the mediation session; others do not.
If formal options do not meet their needs, parties usually create their own
procedural flexibility by agreeing to alternative rules. The new rules may reflect
an agreement regarding discovery or limiting the scope of the dispute, or they may
address more substantive aspects of the dispute.

30. These claims of broad capability may be somewhat exaggerated in the interest of broad
marketing.
31. In high-low, the parties initially agree to low and high bounds for the value of the dispute.
The arbitrator is then limited to this range in deciding the amount of the award. In mediationarbitration, the dispute is mediated, and any unresolved issues are then handled in an arbitration
proceeding.
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2. Procedural Options Among Independent Neutrals
Table 9 shows the percentage of independent neutrals who offer particular
services. Comparing Table 9 to Table 8 indicates that independent neutrals are
less likely than firms to offer a broad range of procedural options to their clients.
Ninety-eight percent of neutrals in our survey report offering arbitration, but only
Table 9
Services Offered by Independent Neutrals(percent)
Percent
Service
98
Arbitration
55
Mediation
41
Voluntary settlement conference
31
Expert neutral fact-finding
28
Private judging
24
Mini-trial
24
Discovery management
I1
Summary jury trial
8
Other

55 percent of the neutrals report offering mediation. Independent neutrals do offer
other procedures, but less frequently than firms do. For example, seven of the
nine firms in our survey offer mini-trials, while only 24 percent of the neutrals
report that they offer this service. Although our survey did not address the
question of flexibility within the different types of procedures, it is our impression
that independent neutrals are less likely to formally codify or publish the rules
they may use, and they are just as agreeable to variants that parties may agree to.
In sum, flexibility in the type of procedures offered and the rules to be
applied is clearly available in the private marketplace.

C. ProceduresProvided
The mix of services actually provided as opposed to the mix of procedures
offered indicates the extent to which the flexibility of the private ADR market is
being utilized by disputants. If the disputants are not taking advantage of this
flexibility, procedural variety may not be as valuable as many proponents argue.
In this analysis, we categorize procedures provided as arbitration, mediation,
private judging, voluntary settlement conferences, and others. The category
"other" includes summary jury trials, med-arb, expert-neutral fact-finding, and
mini-trials.
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1. Procedures Provided by Firms

The mix of services actually provided by firms is dominated by arbitration
and mediation. Table 10 shows that arbitration accounts for 65 percent and
mediation for 24 percent of the services actually provided. All other services
collectively account for only I1 percent of the disputes brought to private ADR
firms.
2. Procedures Provided by Independent Neutrals
The independent neutrals provide a different mix of procedures to their
clients (clients who come directly to them without going first to a firm), with
arbitration and mediation playing a dominant but lesser role than in firms (p <
0.01). While arbitration accounts for 53 percent and mediation 21 percent of this
caseload, voluntary settlement conferences account for 12 percent and private
judging accounts for 7 percent of the procedures actually used. These latter
figures compare with firm usage rates of 0.1 percent and 3 percent for voluntary
settlement conferences and private judging, respectively.
Table 10
Mix of Services Actually Provided (percentage of disputes)
Independent Total Private
ADR
Neutralsb
Firms'
Service
58
53
65
Arbitration
22
21
24
Mediation
5
7
3
Private judging
Voluntary settlement
7
12
0C
conference
7
7
8
Other
SOURCE: Firm data.
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
'The firm data represent 1992 disputes.
bThe independent neutral data represent 1993 disputes.
'The actual figure is 0.1 percent.

3. Total Private ADR Procedural Case Mix
Table 10 indicates that the private ADR market is dominated by arbitration
(58 percent) and mediation (22 percent). 2 Seven percent were handled in
voluntary settlement conferences and 5 percent in private judging. The remaining
7 percent involve other mechanisms, including mini-trials, summary jury trials, and

32. One large firm provider has recently added mediation to its available services and has not yet
had significant usage of mediation. If this provider is eliminated from the market, the remaining firms
show a mix of arbitration to mediation of 50 percent to 32 percent
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med-arb, which do not yet appear to be an important part of the private
marketplace."
Our findings demonstrate that despite the opportunity that disputants may
have to turn to new procedures for the resolution of their disputes, they tend to
rely on the format that is most like the adjudicatory procedure of the courts:
arbitration. At the same time, it is fair to characterizethe procedural environment
as one over which disputants have substantial control, if they choose to seek true
alternatives to adjudication.
4. Trends
Although arbitration may currently dominate the marketplace, anecdotal
information suggests that mediation and other ADR procedures are growing in
Firms interviewed report that disputants are becoming more
popularity.
sophisticated in their understanding and use of ADR and are increasingly turning
to mediation. This may be a reflection of the increasing sophistication of
disputants, or it may be a consequence of the growing familiarity with mediation
as an alternative. In either case, the firms are marketing mediation services with
growing energy.
Respondents to the survey of neutrals confirm that mediation is receiving a
growing share of the private ADR market. When asked if they noticed a change
in the mix of procedures they were providing, 60 percent of those who responded
stated that they were mediating an increasing number of disputes; 13 percent stated
that both mediation and arbitration were increasing; and 13 percent stated that
other forms of private ADR were growing in popularity.

D. PrivateADR Fees
One indicator of the comparative cost of private ADR is the fees charged for
private ADR services. This measure is of limited value because it omits attorneys'
fees and costs, which is a large, and in some cases overwhelming, part of the costs
of dispute resolution. 4 Nonetheless, since the fees charged for private ADR
services can be large and are costs that are not associated with dispute resolution
in the public courts, it is important to understand them.
Fee structures vary depending upon whether disputes are being resolved
through a firm or an independent neutral. Firms typically charge administrative
fees, hearing fees for their neutrals, and additional charges. On the other hand,
independent neutrals typically charge only an hourly rate for their services. In

33. The information provided by the individual providers regarding how frequently private judging
is used conflicts with previous data; see Roehl, HuiM, and Wong, supra note 28. This discrepancy

warrants further research.
34. This very important information should be the subject of future research.
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some instances, a small number of firms and individuals charge by the dispute, but
this is rare.
1. Fee Structures for Firms
Administrative Fees. Table 11 shows that most private ADR firms charge
administrative fees that cover their management and other business costs. It also
shows that these fees vary significantly across firns. The typical fee is $100 to
$150 per party for for-profit firms and from zero to a few thousand dollars for
non-profit firms." This table reflects the fee structure for these firms as of 1993.
Administrative fees can be compared to filing fees in public courts. In fact,
they mirror court fees in that they generally take into account the value of the
action and the number of parties. In the last row of Table 11, we have included
the filing fees for the California state courts. Ranging between $15.00 and
$182,00, these fees are substantially below the fees charged by private ADR firms.
The biggest variation in administrative fees across firms is between the nonprofit and the for-profit firms. Non-profit firms generally charge a fee based on
either the size of the dispute or the income of the disputant. Administrative fees
for the American Arbitration Association, for example, can be quite high if the
amount at issue in the dispute is large. For-profit firms have slightly lower rates.
Since the costs of pursuing cases through for-profit firms generally entail higher
hearing fees for the neutral's time, differences in administrative costs may be
overwhelmed by differences in hearing costs. 6
Hearing Fees. Firms usually charge additional fees to cover the costs of the
third-party neutral. These fees vary substantially from firm to firm and within
firms, depending on which neutral provides services. Table 11 reports the rates
charged by the firms for which we have information. Fees fall in the range of
$500/day-$450/hour. The non-profit firms in the group charge little or no hearing
fees to cover the costs of neutrals because neutrals usually serve on a voluntary
or quasi-voluntary basis. The for-profit firms range from $75/hour/party to
$450/hour/party. In some cases, firms will also vary their hearing fees according
to the amount at issue, the procedure used, and the number of parties involved.
Rates typically do not vary between case types or disputant types."

35. The table and subsequent discussion rely on public information for the nine firms serving the
Los Angeles area. Several of these firms were not included in our data collection, because they were
very small or handled a caseload that did not fall within the scope of this study. Therefore, other parts
of this report will refer to fewer firms than we do here.
36. We did not systematically collect information on the lengths of hearings, but we understand
that these lengths may vary substantially, with some approximating the time required by jury trials.
37. Some firms note that they will work out fee arrangements that may vary from the scheduled
rates for certain clients with a high amount of business.
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Table 11
Private ADR Firm Fees
Firm

Administrative Fee

Alternative Resolution
Centers

$50/party

American Arbitration
Association

Arbitration-Sliding scale
filing fee of $300 for cases
under $25K, up to $4K for
cases over $5M payable by
filing party; plus an
administrative fee of
$100/day/party for I
arbitrator, or $150/day/party
for >1 arbitrator
Mediation-$200 (cases under
$100,000) or $300 (cases over
$100,000) (total for all parties)

Hourly Fee
$250/hr (total for all

parties)

Arbitration Forums, Inc. $150/party

Arbitration-Based
on arbitrator's fee,
typically
approximately
$500/day/arbitrator
Mediation-Based
on mediator's fee

Hourly, based on
judge or attorney
rate

Arts Arbitration &
Mediation Service

Arbitration-Sliding scale
None
based on income of party up to
4% of amount in controversy
or $45/party
Mediation-Small amount
based on income of party

First Mediation Corp.

$100/party

2 parties
$135/party/hr
3 parties
$100/party/hr
4 parties
$75/party/hr

J.A.M.S., Inc.

$100/party for 2-party
dispute
$125/party for 3 or more
parties
Some flat fee programs for
cases under $50K
$200-$450 (No hourly fee)

$150/hr/party if 2party dispute;
<$150/hr/party if
more than 2 parties,
determined by
number of parties
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Table 11-continued
Firm
Judicate, Inc.

Administrative Fee

Hourly Fee

Business & CommercialArbitration & Mediation:
$300/party
Regular Mediation:
$150/party

Business &
CommercialArbitration &
Mediation: $150/party/
hr
Regular-Arbitration:
$300/party 1st hr,
$150/party sub hrs
Mediation: $450/party
1st hr, $150/party sub
hrs

Real Estate Mediation & Arbitration &
Mediation-$150/party
Arbitration

Hourly based on judge/
attorney rate

Arbitration-250-30
$150/party if two-party
United States
0/hr
Arbitration & Mediation dispute
$100/party if more than two Mediation-$2501/hr
party dispute
Public Court3

$15.00 small claims
$80.00 municipal court
$182.00 superior court
SOURCE: Publicly available information.
'Court data based on 1994 filing fees.

None

Other Fees. Parties may also be subject to additional fees, including transcript
fees, reporters' costs, travel expenses, and conference room costs if such services
are requested or necessary. In addition, most of the firms may impose cancellation
fees. If the procedure is not canceled prior to a certain date, these fees can equal
the cost of the neutral's time. Because these fees are rarely imposed, the total cost
of the ADR service is usually represented by the administrative and hearing fees.
2. Fee Structure for Independent Neutrals
Independent neutrals typically charge only for the time they actually spend
on the dispute, including research, travel time, and actual hearing time. In
addition, disputants will typically be required to pay for any other additional costs.
Two
Hourly fees vary considerably among independent neutrals.
characteristics explain much of the variation: their professional background and
whether or not they are affiliated with a firm panel.
Table 12 shows the hourly fees for third-party neutrals reported by our survey
respondents. The mean for the group is $208.96 per hour, while the median fee
for all neutrals is $200.00 per hour. This difference reflects the skewed
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distribution of fees, with a few neutrals charging high fees. Looking at the fees
by professional background (former judges, attorneys, and all others), we find that
judges command the highest fee (median of $250.00 per hour) and those without
formal legal training command the lowest fee (median of $150.00 per hour).
Table 12
Median Hourly Fee by Background and Firm Affiliation(dollars)
Firm Affiliated Non-Firm All Affiliations
Affiliated
250
287
250
Former judges
200
200
200
Attorneys
150
225
150
Non-attorneys
200
250
200
All providers
There is additional variation in rates between those neutrals who offer their
services through firns and those who are not listed on the panels of any firms.
Judges and "others" who provide services through the private ADR firms typically
charge lower hourly fees than the independent neutrals. For example, the median
rate for judges affiliated with firm panels is $250 per hour, while the median rate
for judges who provide their services independent of firms is $287. The median
rate is the same for attorneys regardless whether or not they have firm affiliations.
The data show that fees do not systematically vary with other characteristics.
While fees do increase somewhat with ADR experience, this increase is not
systematic and may be less a reflection of growing expertise in ADR than an age
bias, such as judges and attorneys who have had long histories of jurisprudence
commanding high fees regardless of the length of time they have been providing
private ADR. Likewise, there is no systematic relationship between the number
of disputes heard and the fees commanded by a neutral.
In summary, our survey indicates that flexibility is available to the consumers
of private ADR services. Currently, disputants opt for the private ADR procedure
most like that offered by the courts: arbitration. Anecdotal information indicates
that other forms of private ADR procedure, particularly mediation, are increasingly
becoming popular. Costs are difficult to compare because many of the costs
associated with resolving a dispute are attorneys' fees, the costs which are not
captured in our survey. Nonetheless, we observe that the fees for private ADR
services do vary and usually greatly exceed those levied by the courts.

IV. SERVICE PROVIDERS: THIRD-PARTY NEUTRALS
The source and quality of third-party neutrals figure prominently in the
debate over the potential costs and benefits of private ADR. Many engaged in the
debate raise concerns that the private sector, with its opportunity for higher
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incomes and more hospitable working conditions, may lure good judicial talent
from the public bench. 8
Critics also worry that disputants in private ADR may be receiving seriously
flawed justice. 9 Third-party neutrals who provide private ADR services are
completely unregulated. Neither the state nor any broadly recognizedprofessional
group has developed a set of agreed-upon qualifications or licensing requirements
to apply to this group. ° Thus, the question of quality in private ADR remains.
The issue is particularly compelling because a number of state courts and the
United States Supreme Court have strengthened the binding nature of arbitration
and substantially narrowed the grounds for appeal. Furthermore, many people are
of the opinion that predispute contract agreements cast the "voluntary" nature of
private ADR into question. Particularly in disputes brought to private ADR
because of a predispute contract, parties may be quite unequal in their ability to
protect their own interests within private ADR's confines.
While this research does not provide us with the information necessary for
directly assessing the validity of these concerns, our survey of third-party neutrals
provides data on important characteristics of this population. A number of these
characteristics might well be linked with the ability of neutrals to provide
appropriate and equitable services. These characteristics include:
While the sociodemographic
Sociodemographic Characteristics.
characteristics (age, gender, and ethnicity) of a particular individual shed little
light on that individual's ability as a neutral, diversity within the population of
neutrals may be important in servicing a diverse set of disputants and disputes.
o

Training, Years in ADR, and Specialization. In the absence of more direct
measures of quality, a neutral's background-including legal training, experience
on the bench, training in ADR techniques and procedures, ADR experience, and
substantive expertise-is a useful proxy for his or her ability to perform a
neutral's role.
o

In addition to determining these characteristics, our survey of neutrals allows
us to link the neutrals with the number of cases handled in 1993, the type of case,
the types of ADR services rendered, and claim and award ranges.
In this chapter, we use these measures to report on the characteristics of the
neutral population serving the Los Angeles area. We examine the total population.
We then turn our attention to the small proportion that handles 100 or more cases

38. See supra note 5.
39. Id.
40. The California Judicial Council has adopted a behavioral code to guide neutrals who hear
court-referenced cases, but no code applies to all third-party neutrals (California Adopts Rules
Governing Private Judging (1993)). The question of what qualification and licensing requirements
might be appropriate is currently a topic of intense debate in the profession. See, e.g., SPIDR
COMMISSION ON QUALIFCATIONS (1993).
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per year and accounts for 59 percent of the total private caseload. Finally, we
examine the caseload characteristics of independent neutrals.

A. Characteristicsof Third-PartyNeutrals
1. Firm ADR Providers in Los Angeles
We identified 22 firms providing ADR services in Los Angeles County.
After an initial screening process, we concluded that 13 of these firms are outside
the scope of this study because the services they provide do not conform with our
definition of private ADR. These excluded firms include a local bar association,
the Better Business Bureau and national referral organizations. Table 13 lists the
remaining nine firms that offer private services for the disposition of civil money
disputes in Los Angeles County."' These firms differ in size, location, age,
organizational structure, and marketing and business strategy.
The providers include five large42 national companies and four local
companies, all with varying market shares. Some firms have numerous offices in
Los Angeles County and outside Southern California. In general, the firms based
outside of Los Angeles County are larger than the local firms, although local firms
are increasing their market shares. Some of the nine firnms are well-established,
and some are new firms. The first firm opened an office in Southern California
in 1926. It was not until 1964, however, that the second organization appeared
and others followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Three of the firms are nonprofit and six are for-profit. Currently, only one of the firms is a publicly traded
corporation.
Local staffing generally varies with the size of the firm. Firms usually
employ only administrative staff and provide their dispute resolution services
through nonexclusive independent contracts with retired judges, attorneys, and
others. Only rarely will firms employ neutrals as members of their staffs. One
large firm, however, uses only exclusive contracts in retaining its panel of neutrals,
while others may selectively employ exclusive contracts.

41. As previously described, we subsequently returned to the six firms that are actually providing
private ADR services in Los Angeles County for the data we describe in this report.
42. Our definition of size is based on number of cases, number of providers, and amount of
revenue. To maintain the anonymity of our sources, we do not provide these data, but instead present
an indicator of relative size based on these data.
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Marketing strategies differ among the firms. In the past, finns did not
narrowly prescribe their business specialties. Recently, they have begun
specializing in particular types of disputes with tailored marketing efforts. For
example, Real Estate Arbitration and Mediation, Inc., established in 1990,
specializes in real estate-related disputes. Other recently established firms
specialize in insurance and tort disputes. Traditional firm marketing tools include
advertising, seminars, directory listings, and cold-calling prospective clients.
2. Independent Neutral Providers in Los Angeles
Independent neutral providers are an integral part of the Los Angeles private
ADR marketplace, handling over half of the disputes brought to that area.43 The
number of independent neutrals providing private ADR services in Los Angeles
County total about 1,200." These neutrals have a broad range of backgrounds,
market shares, ages, interests, and business and marketing strategies.45 They
often play a dual role, hearing both disputes that are brought to them directly and
disputes that are brought to them through firms on whose panels they serve.46
Eighty-eight percent of the neutrals list themselves as being on at least one panel.
The most prevalent form of marketing for neutrals is word of mouth (cited
by 50 percent of the neutrals in our survey). Only 11 percent claim to advertise
their services. Eighty-six percent of the neutrals state that they have additional
employment besides ADR. This additional employment probably offers these
respondents an additional venue for attracting business.
Neutrals claim to specialize in the types of disputes they handle and the types
of procedures they offer to a greater extent than firms do. Forty-one percent of
the neutrals claim to specialize in a particular form of private ADR service. In
addition, 68 percent state that they specialize in a particular type of dispute. In
contrast, only two of the nine firms stated a similar concentration.

B. SociodemographicCharacteristics
In addition to looking at sociodemographic characteristics of the neutral
community as a whole, we analyzed various subpopulations, including those with

43. See Section Three, Table 8.
44. This figure includes those individuals we identified through the procedures described in the
Introduction. It is probable that there are a small number of individuals who live outside of the Los
Angeles area and do not advertise or otherwise market themselves in Los Angeles, but who,
nonetheless, serve the area.
45. See Section Four.
46. Some firms, however, require or negotiate exclusive agreements with the neutrals on their
panels on a case-by-case basis.
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different professional backgrounds and those with and without firm panel
affiliations. Table 14 presents the results of this analysis and few surprises.
Neutrals, as a group, come from the ranks of experienced professionals. Eight
percent are former judges, 67 percent are attorneys, and the remaining 25 percent
have a diverse set of other backgrounds. Their median age is 60 years, with some
tendency toward clustering in the 40s and later 60s. Lawyers tend to be somewhat
younger, while former judges tend to be somewhat older. The majority of neutrals
are listed on one or more firm panels.
Very little diversity exists in the community of neutrals. Women are poorly
represented, with fewer of them coming from the ranks of the judiciary and a
relatively greater number from the category of "other." Representation from
ethnic minorities is similarly low.

C. CharacteristicsRelating to Training and Experience
Table 15 shows that slightly greater than half of the neutral population has
had some form of training or apprenticeship in ADR techniques, with neutrals who
are former judges and neutrals who are not panel members substantially less likely
to have had training. Much of this variation can be explained by finrn practices.
Most firms provide training sessions in ADR procedures and techniques for new
panel members. The one large firm that does not provide training will empanel
only former judges. Independent neutrals who have had judicial experience are
probably less likely to believe that they are in need of training, while those with
no legal background are more likely to want the additional training.

All neutrals

Table 15
Training and Experience of Neutrals
Years in ADR Years on Bench
Training
(judges only)
Apprentice
Formal and Other Median Mean Median Mean
N/A
N/A
8
11
6
47

(N=1212)

By backgrounda
44
Lawyers (N=785)
21
Judges (N--91)
63
Other (N=301)
By panelb
49
On firm panels
(N=1013)
35
Not on firm panels
(N=140)
'No answer for 35 neutrals.
'No answer for 59 neutrals.
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The population of neutrals in Los Angeles has substantial dispute resolution
experience. Judges, on average, tend to have been rendering ADR services for
fewer years than others because they tend to start later in their careers. While the
median years in ADR for all neutrals is eight, a few have been in the business
substantially longer. For example, several neutrals report over 30 years of
experience. Although many judges enter the private sector with exactly 20 years
of experience on the bench, there is a wide distribution above and below this
number, with several neutrals reporting as little as four years and a few as many
as 30 years. Twenty appears to be a marker year because judges become eligible
for retirement benefits after twenty years of service.47 Judges are somewhat more
likely to leave the bench prior to retirement if they join a firm's panel-a work
setting in which they are likely to have a secured stream of clients.

D. Characteristicsof "Heavy Hitters"
The above description characterizes the total population of neutrals available
to consumers in the marketplace; but, is it a profile of the neutrals actually
handling the private caseload? That is, how are disputes distributed across this
population of neutrals, and if they are distributed unevenly, what are the
characteristics of those neutrals providing the bulk of the services? Put yet
another way, what characteristics do consumers seem to prefer? Figure 4 shows
that more than half of all neutrals see fewer than 10 disputes annually, while less
than 10 percent of the neutrals see more than half of the total disputes.
Since disputes are so highly concentrated in the hands of relatively few
neutrals, we also looked at the characteristics of the 57 neutrals who each handled
100 or more disputes in 1993. Almost half of our group of neutrals (46 percent)
came from the bench, while 49 percent came from private practice and only 5
percent came from other professional backgrounds. The "heavy hitters" are
slightly older as a group (median age of 67 compared with a median age of 60 for
the others), and a smaller percentage have had formal training in ADR (39 percent
compared with 47 percent). In other respects, the "heavy hitters" similarly
resemble the total population of neutrals.4"

47. A judge qualifies to receive a pension equal to 65 or 75 percent ofhis or her salary at the time
of retirement if the judge has satisfied age and term requirements. See Cal. Government Code §§
75025, et seq. 1992).
48. This statement reflects comparisons between the two groups along many dimensions, including
case type, service provided, claim amount, award amount, and hourly fees.
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Distribution of Number of Cases Across the Neutral Population

E. Neutrals' CaseloadCharacteristics
In addition to determining what sociodemographic, training, and experience
characteristics 49 typify the community of neutrals, we used information from the
survey of neutrals to explore the relationship between the professional background
of neutrals and the type of dispute, the size and value of their independent
5 °
It
caseloads, and the types of procedures they typically use for these cases.
should be noted that because these disputes come directly to the neutrals, our
results will not be confounded by the influence of a neutral's affiliation with a
particular firm.
The professional background of neutrals has a substantial effect on the mix
of disputes they handle. Tables 16a and 16b show that there is a significant
difference (p < 0.01) among the types of cases handled by neutrals with different
backgrounds. The case mix of former judges is dominated by auto personal injury
disputes. Attorneys, in contrast, handle a significant number of personal injury
employment disputes.

49. In Section Four, we also examine the relationship between professional background and fees.
50. We have no comparable data for cases handled through firms.
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Table 16a
Distribution of Case Types Within Provider Backgrounds (percent)
Provider Background

Total Case Type

Distribution
Other
Lawyer
Judge
Case Types
46
42
46
47
Auto personal injury
16
20
26
2
Employment
9
7
10
8
Other contracts
Non-auto personal
6
9
3
10
injury
5
3
4
8
Real property
5
2
1
9
Malpractice
4
4
4
5
Construction
2
3
2
4
Other tort
2
5
2
3
Other
2
1
1
2
Product liability
2
3
2
2
Consumer disputes
1
0
0
1
Environmental
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 16b
Distribution of Provider Backgrounds Within Case Types(percent)
Provider Background
Other
Lawyer
Judge
Case Types
5
53
42
Auto personal injury
7
88
5
Employment
4
60
36
Other contracts
7
28
65
Non-auto personal injury
3
38
60
Real property
2
16
82
Malpractice
5
51
44
Construction
6
34
59
Other tort
11
35
53
Other
3
34
62
Product liability
8
48
45
Consumer disputes
4
13
84
Environmental
5
53
42
Total provider distribution
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
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Table 17
Distribution of Certain Types of Cases
Coming to Neutrals by Professional Backgrounda
Case Size
Percentage
($ thousands)
Judge Lawyer Other of Total Cases
<25
25
68
7
32
25-50
52
41
7
20
51-100
52
43
5
21
101-500
64
33
3
16
>500
63
32
5
11
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
aData for independent caseload only.
Over half of all environmental, malpractice, non-auto personal injury, product
liability, and real property cases are heard by former judges. Eighty-eight percent
of all employment and 58 percent of "other contract" disputes are heard by
attorneys. Interestingly, although former judges represent only 8 percent of all
neutrals, they hear 42 percent of all disputes.
Similarly, in Table 17, we see significant differences (p < 0.01) in the value
of the caseloads of former judges, attorneys, and other neutrals. While attorneys
handle almost 70 percent of all cases claiming less than $25,000, former judges
handle over half the cases in each of the higher claim categories. These results
remain consistent with our previous observation that former judges handle a
disproportionate share of certain types of cases that may be above average in
value, such as malpractice. Since auto personal injury is such a large fraction of
the total caseload, however, this data suggest that former judges are more likely
than attorneys to handle the more valuable cases of a given type, as well.
Finally, a neutral's professional background is likely to affect the type of
procedures provided. Table 18 shows significant differences in services provided.
In particular, former judges provide voluntary settlement conferences and "private
judging" much more often than do attorneys. On the other hand, attorneys provide
arbitration to more than two-thirds of their clients. These results strongly suggest
that neutrals render the services they are most familiar with and most
knowledgeable about.
Table 18
Procedures Provided by Neutral's Professional Background'(percent)
Judges Lawyers
Other
Total
Arbitration
38
69
34
53
Mediation
20
19
42
21
Voluntary settlement
conference
22
4
11
12
Private Judging
14
2
1
7
Other
6
6
12
7
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
93Data for independent caseload only.
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In sum, our analysis of neutrals' characteristics indicates that they are not
particularly diverse with respect to their sociodemographic characteristics. They
are experienced professionals with most having legal training and experience.
Slightly more than 50 percent of the neutrals have had training in ADR practices
and techniques, and the group as a whole has considerable experience delivering
private ADR. Furthermore, disputes are not divided evenly across the neutral
population. Almost half the neutrals who handle over 100 cases per year are
former judges. Except for this heavy caseload, "heavy hitters" as a group
generally resemble neutrals as a whole. Finally, we learned that the professional
background of neutrals significantly influences their case mix and the procedures
they are likely to provide.

V. FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
At the outset of this report, we identified the major claims and allegations
central to the current debate over the growth of private ADR, noting that the
information to resolve them did not exist. The goal of this study is to develop the
basic descriptive profile of the private ADR marketplace in Los Angeles, so that
it might serve as the basis for more focused inquiries into specific policy concerns.
Some of our findings, however, do have direct or indirect bearing on these policy
concerns. Therefore, in this chapter, we summarize our findings and discuss their
implications in the current debate.

A. Findings
The findings of this study bear on several sectors of the marketplace,
including the caseload, services provided within the private sector and
characteristics of the service providers and third-party neutrals. Our principal
findings are summarized as follows.
1. Findings Regarding Caseload Characteristics
Size. Although the private caseload is a small fraction of all formal disputes
in Los Angeles, it is a rapidly growing fraction.
o

o
Dispute Characteristics. The disputes going to private ADR are relatively
high-value and durable disputes. Almost half of the disputes are auto personal
injury disputes.

o Disputant Characteristics. Both businesses and individuals are well
represented in the disputant population in private ADR, and it appears that insurers
play a very important role in bringing both types of disputants to the alternative
forum.
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2. Findings Regarding Private ADR Procedures
ADR Procedures Offered. The private marketplace offers a full range of
procedural options from which a consumer may choose. In addition, consumers
usually may, by mutual agreement, tailor the rules of procedure used. Independent
neutrals are less likely than firms to offer less-standard procedures, such as minitrials or summary jury trials.
Use of Private ADR Procedures. Although a wide variety of procedures are
available, consumers strongly prefer the more traditional forms of ADR such as
arbitration and, to a lesser degree, mediation. Some evidence, however, supports
a growing interest in other forms.
o

Fees Associated with Private ADR. The fee structure for private arbitration
is complex and variable. Firms charge administrative fees, hearing fees, and fees
to cover other costs. Independent neutrals typically charge only an hourly rate for
their time. These fees typically exceed fees imposed by courts during litigation.
o

3. Findings Regarding Third-Party Neutrals
o
Sociodemographic Characteristics. Neutrals cover a broad age range but
are homogeneous with respect to gender and ethnicity.

Training and Experience. Neutrals as a group have a broad base of legal
training and ADR experience. Seventy-five percent have legal training, and 8
percent are former judges. In addition, more than half have some form of training
in ADR procedures and techniques, and they average 11 years of experience in
providing ADR services.
Characteristics of Heavy Hitters. Most disputes are handled by a small
share of neutrals. While 62 percent see fewer than 10 cases per year and account
for only 9 percent of the total caseload, 8 percent of the neutrals see over 100
cases per year and account for 59 percent of the total caseload. Almost half of the
"heavy hitters" (46 percent) are former judges. Otherwise, "heavy hitters" do not
differ markedly from neutrals as a whole along the dimensions we examined.
o

o
Professional Experience and Caseload Characteristics. The professional
experience of neutrals is likely to have implications for their case mixes and for
the types of procedures they provide. Former judges are somewhat more likely
to see certain types of less-common cases (for example malpractice and
environmental disputes) and higher-value disputes. Attorneys are far more likely
to arbitrate disputes than judges or "others," and judges are far more likely than
attorneys or "others" to provide procedures that approximate those of the court.
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B. Discussion
While they do not directly address or resolve the issues surrounding private
ADR, these findings are strongly suggestive of answers to several controversial
and important points.
1. Effects of Private ADR on the Courts
Reducing the Court's Workload. At the moment, private ADR cannot be
lightening the civil caseload of courts in Los Angeles to any appreciable degree
because the private caseload is simply too small. Our findings, however, suggest
that it does have considerable potential for accomplishing this goal eventually
because it is such a rapidly growing component of all dispute resolution activity.
Furthermore, a disproportionate share of high-value and durable disputes-disputes
that might be expected to consume larger-than-average amounts of court timeare resolved through private ADR, suggesting it holds even greater potential for
reducing the demands on the courts than might initially be expected.
Diverting Judicial Talent. The results of our study do not enable us to
conclusively confirm or deny that the private sector is stripping the bench of
valuable judicial talent. We can say, however, that about 91 former judges are
now offering their services in Los Angeles as neutrals in private ADR. Most of
the judges retired from the bench following 20 years of service and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as leaving the bench "prematurely." On the other hand,
it is likely that, absent the option of becoming a neutral, a number of them would
not have chosen to retire but rather would have contributed some additional years
of service on the bench. Thus, private ADR may well be "stripping the bench"
of some judges, but at least thus far, it does not seem to be attracting them in
substantial numbers before retirement age.
It remains to be decided at what point a move to the private sector ceases to
be "stripping the bench" and becomes a desirable "transition" opportunity. It may
be that the private sector offers senior judges an appropriate chance to work and
then incrementally "wind down" their practices according to their own preferences
or in response to signals from the marketplace which are harder to send to sitting
judges.
It is frequently asserted that the problem of "stripping" is not a problem of
numbers but of the "best talent" going to the private sector. Indeed, if this is the
case, then it will lend more credence to concerns that the private sector will
become a source of two-tiered justice serving the affluent. Our study, however,
is unable to address this issue.
Impeding the Court's Ability to Establish Precedent and Reinforce Social
Norms. Some opponents of private ADR argue that its growth will divert cases
that may have precedential value and reduce the courts' ability to reinforce social
standards through the public decision process. Characteristics of the current
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marketplace certainly do not justify these fears. Not only is the proportion of the
total dispute caseload going to the private sector small, but auto personal injury
disputes account for almost half of the private caseload. These characteristics do
not immediately suggest that the public sector is losing important cases.
Opponents' concerns may be more nearly realized in the future, however,
if large proportions (whether or not the actual numbers are large) of particular
kinds of disputes over issues where the case law is still fluid are diverted to the
private sector through predispute contracting. Examples might be medical
malpractice or environmental disputes.
2. Quality of the Private Sector
Assuring Procedural Quality. Private ADR differs from public adjudication in
two ways that bear on quality. Neutrals are not selected on the basis of any
public standards, nor are they held to any public standard. Furthermore, private
proceedings are not public and, therefore, are not subject to the kind of scrutiny
that may encourage neutrals to be attentive to quality."' Particularly because case
law now makes appeal of any private ADR decision exceedingly difficult, there
is good reason to focus on the issue of quality control in the private setting.
Although we cannot draw any direct conclusions regarding the quality of the
private ADR providers or services from the findings of our study, some of the
results are certainly suggestive.
In general, it is fair to say that neutrals, as a group, have substantial training,
are likely to have legal training, often have specific training (albeit probably not
extensive) in ADR procedures and techniques, and have provided services for a
number of years. Thus, to the degree that experience is a proxy for quality, Los
Angeles neutrals, on average, should be competent. Relying on "experience" as
the source of quality, however, may have its own problems. Our findings indicate
that the more closely coupled a neutral is with the adjudicative paradigm, the less
likely he or she is to use alternatives to that paradigm. Thus, neutrals would seem
to be unlikely catalysts for major procedural shifts. It is possible, on the other
hand, that, in confining themselves to the more traditional procedural formats,
neutrals are simply responding to the demands of the parties or the agents of the
parties. If demand shifts, so should the menu of services they render.
Assuring Fairness of Outcome. Many argue that the impartiality essential to fair
decisions cannot be counted on in the private sector because financial incentives
work to the contrary. This is the "repeat-playerproblem." According to the logic
of these critics, providers (firms and neutrals) will favor those clients who are
likely to bring repeat business. A number of our findings bear on this issue.

51. Few firms report having any formal quality-assurance mechanisms, although some actively
solicit feedback from clients on their satisfaction with the services of the neutral(s).
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Our findings clearly indicate that private ADR is a business for the providers
who account for most of the caseload. Even most non-profit firms behave
competitively as they tailor their offerings and seek new clients. For the neutrals
who handle most of the private caseload, private ADR is a serious professional
and economic endeavor, occupying much of their time. Therefore, both fins and
neutrals (although not necessarily most of the neutrals) handling most of the
disputes can be expected to be quite sensitive to the satisfaction of customers they
value.
This said, one cannot automatically conclude that neutrals are likely to bias
their decisions to please certain customers. It may well be that firms and neutrals
see the best avenue to long-term success in establishing a clear reputation for
fairness;52 after all, both parties must agree to any choice of neutral, and even
repeat customers may well prefer a fair neutral to one who may show bias.53
Preserving Access to Private ADR. In the past, ADR was the province of
nonprofit firms and pro-bono neutrals. As such, it has been heralded as the
solution for those who cannot afford the costs of disputing in the courts. 4 As
private ADR becomes a for-profit enterprise, it may substantially reduce disputing
options for the less advantaged. Our results show that the costs specifically
associated with ADR proceedings are likely to be substantially higher than court
costs. We do not, however, compare the total costs of public and private-sector
disputing. It is this comparison that is most meaningful.

C. FurtherResearch
To reaffirm the cautionary note we sounded at the beginning of this report,
it is important to remember that, while our findings may be suggestive, they
describe only one private ADR marketplace. Although we have no reason to
believe that Los Angeles differs from what is now or from what will be occurring
shortly in other major metropolitan areas, legal cultures can differ markedly from
place to place. Therefore, the next step must be to determine whether or not our
findings apply in other locales. Beyond that step, this descriptive analysis lays the
groundwork for important additional research.55

52. See the comments of Judge Knight in Reuben supra note 5, at 55.
53. In addition, case law establishes that one of the few grounds for attacking an arbitrator's
decision is bias. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1286.2 (1992).
54. It should be noted that while this argument is made, the data do not consistently support the
proposition that ADR is cheaper than going to court. See supra note 5 at 54.
55. For a similar, but not identical list, see Roehl supra note 28.
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1. Consequences for Disputants
Although it is often argued that private dispute resolution offers significant
practical benefits to disputants, there is little or no evidence verifying these
benefits. To ascertain the value of this alternative form of dispute resolution, it
would be useful to learn how total disputing costs (expert-witness fees, other casedevelopment costs, and attorney fees) in the private sector compare with those in
the public sector. Similarly, how do disposition times vary between the two
sectors, and how satisfied are disputants with the processes they encounter in
private and public forums? Since it is unlikely that all types of disputes are
equally well served by the same alternative procedure, it would also be helpful to
know what kinds of disputes are most appropriate for the private forum and how
cases and procedures might be productively matched.
At the same time, questions have been raised regarding the equity of
outcomes in the private arena, and policymakers need to learn whether or not the
market is structured in such a way that disputants of all stripes are likely to gain
a fair and unbiased hearing. While concern regarding a potential bias favoring
"repeat players" has focused on large businesses and insurers, attorneys are likely
to be instrumental in selecting neutrals. Thus, their role as repeat players should
also be examined closely. In addition, the quality of the outcome is likely to
depend on the talents of the neutral. As a result, a deeper understanding of what
particular talents lead to equitable and satisfying outcomes would be helpful.
2. Consequences for the Public Sector
While this study has presented some findings that suggest private ADR may
well reduce the court workload, our results are inconclusive. To draw strong
conclusions, we must know more about the characteristics of the disputes being
resolved in private ADR. How complex are they? Would they have been
litigated. And would they have settled early in the litigation process had they been
pursued in the courts?
At the same time, private ADR may adversely affect the ability of the courts
to attract and retain good judges. Our findings are both preliminary and mixed
on this subject, and additional research is warranted.
Regarding the fear that the private sector may lay claim to important,
precedent-setting disputes, we need to learn more about the types of cases and
proportions of each type of case that are resolved through private ADR. It will
be particularly important to examine how the use of predispute contracts is
increasing, and whether or not their increase might remove whole classes of
disputes from the public sector. At the moment, this eventuality appears to pose
private ADR's most significant threat to the evolution of case law.
Thus, while this study provides important information about the dynamics and
characteristics of the private disputing marketplace, it leaves a significant number
of questions unanswered. Further, because private ADR is likely to remain an
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important and growing phenomenon, these questions should be explored in more
detail.
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